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ABSTRACT
A Bayesian consumer who is uncertain about the quality of an information source will infer that the
source is of higher quality when its reports conform to the consumer's prior expectations. We use this
fact to build a model of media bias in which firms slant their reports toward the prior beliefs of their
customers in order to build a reputation for quality. Bias emerges in our model even though it can
make all market participants worse off. The model predicts that bias will be less severe when
consumers receive independent evidence on the true state of the world, and that competition between
independently owned news outlets can reduce bias. We present a variety of empirical evidence
consistent with these predictions.
Matthew Gentzkow
University of Chicago





5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
and NBER
jmshapir@uchicago.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
On December 2, 2003, American troops fought a battle in the Iraqi city of Samarra. Fox News
began its story on the event with the following paragraph:
In one of the deadliest reported ﬁreﬁghts in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, US
forces killed at least 54 Iraqis and captured eight others while fending oﬀ simultaneous convoy
ambushes Sunday in the northern city of Samarra (Fox News 2003).
The New York Times article on the same event began:
American commanders vowed Monday that the killing of as many as 54 insurgents in this central
Iraqi town would serve as a lesson to those ﬁghting the United States, but Iraqis disputed the
death toll and said anger against America would only rise (New York Times 2003).
And the English-language website of the satellite network Al Jazeera began:
The US military has vowed to continue aggressive tactics after saying it killed 54 Iraqis following
an ambush, but commanders admitted they had no proof to back up their claims. The only
corpses at Samarra’s hospital were those of civilians, including two elderly Iranian visitors and
a child (AlJazeera.net 2003).
All of the accounts are based on the same set of underlying facts. Yet by selective omission, choice
of words, and varying credibility ascribed to the primary source, each conveys a radically diﬀerent
impression of what actually happened. The choice to slant information in this way is what we will
mean in this paper by media bias.
Such bias has been widely documented, both internationally and within the United States
(Groseclose and Milyo, forthcoming).1 Concern about bias has played a prominent role in many
policy debates, ranging from public diplomacy in the Middle East (Satloﬀ, 2003; Peterson et al,
2003) to ownership regulation by the FCC (Cooper, Kimmelman and Leanza, 2001). Moreover,
survey evidence revealing rising polarization and falling trust in the news media has prompted
concerns about the market’s ability to deliver credible information to the public (Kohut, 2004).
In this paper, we develop a new model of media bias. We start from a simple assumption: A
media ﬁrm wants to build a reputation as a provider of accurate information. If the quality of the
1The diﬀerences between the slant of Arab and American news sources in covering the Middle East are documented
at length by Ajami (2001). A sampling of recent works documenting bias in US national media includes books
by Franken (2003), Coulter (2003), Goldberg (2003), and Alterman (2003). Underhill and Pepper (2003) discuss
accusations of prejudicial reporting at the BBC.
2information a given ﬁrm provides is diﬃcult to observe directly, consumer beliefs about quality will
be based largely on observations of past reports. Firms will then have an incentive to shape these
reports in whatever way will be most likely to improve their reputations and thus increase their
future proﬁts by expanding the demand for their product.
Our ﬁrst set of results shows that ﬁrms will tend to distort information to make it conform
with consumers’ prior beliefs. To see why, consider that a noisy or inaccurate signal is more likely
to produce reports that contradict the truth. An agent who has a strong prior belief about the
true state of the world will therefore expect inaccurate information sources to contradict that belief
more often than accurate ones. Suppose, for example, that a newspaper reports that scientists have
successfully produced cold fusion. If a consumer believes this to be highly unlikely ap r i o r i ,s h e
will rationally infer that the paper probably has poor information or exercised poor judgment in
interpreting the available evidence. A media ﬁrm concerned about its reputation for accuracy will
therefore be reluctant to report evidence at odds with consumers’ priors, even if they believe the
evidence to be true. The more priors favor a given position, the less likely the ﬁrm becomes to
print a story contradicting that position.
Our second main result is that when consumers have access to a source that can provide ex-post
veriﬁcation of the true state of the world, ﬁrms’ incentives to distort information are weakened.
If a ﬁrm misreports its signal so as to move closer to consumers’ priors, it runs the risk that the
truth will come out and its report will be falsiﬁed, damaging its reputation. As the likelihood of
ex-post feedback about the state of the world improves, the amount of bias occurring in equilibrium
decreases. Our model therefore predicts less bias in contexts where predictions are concrete and
outcomes are immediately observable–forecasting weather, sports outcomes, or stock returns, for
example. It predicts more bias in coverage of a foreign war, discussion of the impact of alternative
tax policies, or summary of scientiﬁc evidence about global warming, contexts where outcomes are
diﬃcult to observe and are often not realized until long after the report is made.
The analysis of feedback foreshadows our third result: Competition in the news market can lead
to lower bias. A ﬁrm competing with another news outlet runs the risk that, if it distorts its signal,
the competitor’s report will expose the inaccuracy and thus reduce consumers’ assessments of the
distorting ﬁrm’s quality. We also show that if all ﬁrms in a market are jointly owned, bias can
3remain unchanged even as the number of ﬁrms gets large.
At the end of the paper, we present empirical evidence on the determinants of bias. We review
a range of existing evidence suggesting that feedback can limit bias, and that in high-feedback
settings, such as weather reporting, bias tends to be relatively minor. We also highlight the fact
that local sports columnists do not excessively favor their local teams in forecasting game outcomes,
which is consistent with an important role for rapid feedback in limiting the incentive to slant.
Finally, we discuss anecdotal evidence suggesting that media ﬁrms in more competitive markets
have stronger incentives to reveal important information, and show quantitatively that television
news reports leading up to the 2000 election were more equitable in their treatment of Bush and
Gore in more competitive markets.
Formally, our work is most closely related to the literature on “herding on the priors,” which
considers the way agents’ incentives to act on or reveal information depend on the prior beliefs of
those who will ultimately determine their rewards. In this vein, Brandenburger and Polak (1996)
show that a ﬁrm manager concerned about his ﬁrm’s current stock price may choose the action
favored by shareholders’ priors even when he has private information showing this is ineﬃcient. The
manager’s desire to maximize current stock prices plays a role similar to the reputational incentives
in our framework: it gives the decision-maker an incentive to slant its action toward the prior beliefs
of another agent. Prendergast (1993) shows that similar concerns will lead a worker to skew her
reports to match the data that her manager has received, again leading valuable information to
be lost in equilibrium.2 In contrast to much of this literature, however, the reputational concerns
we model provide an additional incentive for honesty, which in turn guarantees the presence of an
informative equilibrium. In this sense, our model is also related to work on reputational eﬀects in
sender-receiver games (see, e.g., Morris, 2001; Eﬃnger and Polborn, 2001; Avery and Meyer, 2003;
Olszewski, 2004; and Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2005a and 2005b). We deviate from these papers
in highlighting the importance of the receiver’s prior beliefs for the equilibrium reporting strategy,
and in showing the eﬀects of ex-post revelation on equilibrium reporting.3
2See also Heidues and Lagerlöf, 2000 for an application to political competition.
3See Ely and Välimäki (2003) and Ely, Fudenberg and Levine (2002) for other models in which reputational
concerns lead to distortions in equilibrium.
4Topically, our work is related to the growing body of economic research on media bias. Existing
economic models of bias all take as given that some agents in the economy–consumers (Mul-
lainathan and Shleifer, forthcoming), reporters (Baron, 2003), or governments (Besley and Prat,
2004)–prefer for news suppliers to distort the information they provide.4 In contrast, our model
shows that bias can arise even when news consumers care only about learning the truth, news sell-
ers care only about maximizing proﬁts, and eliminating bias could make all agents in the economy
better oﬀ. While we do not deny that some agents may prefer for the news media to distort their
reports, our ﬁndings suggest that caution is warranted in interpreting media slant as evidence for
such tastes. Additionally, our framework generates novel, testable predictions that distinguish it
from these existing theories. Most notably, our prediction that increased competition lowers the
incentive to bias reports toward consumer priors contrasts sharply with that of Mullainathan and
Shleifer (forthcoming), who argue that increased competition will tighten the connection between
priors and reports.
In the next section we discuss the role of reputational incentives in media markets. In section
3 we present the model for a simple monopoly case, and show that equilibrium bias is correlated
with consumer priors and decreasing in the amount of ex post feedback. In section 4, we extend
the model to allow for multiple ﬁrms, and develop the intuition that competition can reduce bias
by increasing the likelihood that erroneous reports are exposed. In section 5, we extend the model
to allow consumers with heterogeneous prior beliefs to coexist in the same market. We show that
it is possible to have segmented equilibria where each ﬁrm provides information to only one type
of consumer and slants its reports accordingly, and that the key comparative statics remain valid
in this setting. Section 6 presents empirical evidence supporting our key ﬁndings, and section 7
concludes.
2 Credibility, Quality, and Bias in the Media
In this section, we present evidence supporting two key building blocks of our model: Media ﬁrms
try to build a reputation for truthful reporting, and consumers’ assessments of the quality of news
4An earlier version of Mullainathan and Shleifer’s (2002) paper does not assume that consumers have a taste for
conﬁrmatory information but generates similar behavior through a mechanism in which consumers think categorically.
5sources depend on prior beliefs. We also present evidence conﬁrming the intuition suggested in the
ﬁrst paragraph of the introduction that ﬁrms’ reporting strategies are highly related to the prior
beliefs of their consumers.
2.1 The Importance of Reputation in Media Markets
At the heart of our model will be media ﬁrms’ desire to maintain a reputation for accuracy in
reporting. The high costs ﬁrms are willing to incur to gather information provide strong evidence
of such an incentive,5 as does the response of media ﬁrms whose reports are revealed to have
been inaccurate. For example, on September 8, 2004, CBS News anchor Dan Rather reported the
emergence of new evidence indicating that President Bush’s family had pulled strings in order to
get him into the Texas Air National Guard and avoid his having to serve in Vietnam. When later
information indicated that the documents on which the report was based may have been fabricated,
both Rather and CBS President Andrew Heyward issued apologies emphasizing the importance of
a reputation for truth-telling in journalism. Heyward wrote that “nothing is more important to
[CBS] than our credibility and keeping faith with the millions of people who count on us for fair,
accurate, reliable, and independent reporting. We will continue to work tirelessly to be worthy of
that trust” (Heyward, 2004). Rather’s statement echoed Heyward’s, explaining that “nothing is
more important to [CBS] than people’s trust in our ability and our commitment to report fairly
and truthfully” (Rather, 2004).
Similarly, the exposure of Jayson Blair’s fraudulent reporting at the New York Times prompted
the resignation of top-ranking editors Howell Raines and Gerald M. Boyd. Former Tupperware chief
executive Warren L. Batts remarked, “They, of course, had to resign... Any company has to sell the
credibility of its product, but a media company has nothing else to sell” (Kirkpatrick and Fabrikant,
2003).6
5To take one example, Andrew Lack, President of NBC News, estimated at the beginning of the war in Afghanistan
that covering it would cost each network approximately 1 million dollars per week–10 percent of their total weekly
expenditures (Auletta 2001). One would not expect to see this level of expense if consumers were not signiﬁcantly
concerned with the factual content of news.
6An investigation by the Times discovered that Blair had “fabricated comments,” “concocted scenes,” and “se-
lected details from photographs to create the impression he had been somewhere or seen someone, when he had not”
(Barry et al, 2003). New York Times publisher Arthur Sulzberger Jr. called Blair’s deceptions “an abrogation of the
trust between the newspaper and its readers” (Barry et al, 2003).
62.2 The Inﬂuence of Priors on Quality Assessments
Our model will draw upon a general property of Bayesian updating about source quality; namely,
that a source is judged to be of higher quality when its reports are more consistent with the agent’s
prior beliefs.7 A large body of psychological research documents a strong connection between
subjects’ prior views and their assessments of information sources. In perhaps the best known
paper on this subject, Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) show that experimental subjects evaluating
studies of the deterrence eﬀect of the death penalty rate studies supporting their prior beliefs as
both more “convincing” and “better done.”8 This basic ﬁnding is replicated and expanded by Lord,
Lepper, and Preston (1984), Miller et al. (1993), and Munro and Ditto (1997). Along the same
lines, Koehler (1993) shows that scientists rate experiments as higher quality when the experimental
results conform to the scientists’ belief about a controversial issue.
Evidence on consumer assessments of media quality in the real world show a similar pattern.
To take one example, ﬁgure 1 shows that in a recent survey nearly 30 percent of respondents who
described themselves as “conservative” indicated that they thought they could believe all or most of
what the Fox Cable News Network says. In contrast, less than 15 percent of self-described liberals
said that they could believe all or most of what the network reports. Ratings of National Public
Radio, show the opposite pattern: more than 35 percent of liberals believe all or most of what NPR
says, as opposed to less than 20 percent of conservatives.9 Taken together these pieces of evidence
strongly suggest that prior beliefs inﬂuence consumers’ judgements of quality in the way a Bayesian
model would predict.
7Our supplemental appendix, available online, provides a proof of this property under fairly general conditions.
See also Prendergast (1993) and Brandenburger and Polak (1996).
8This paper is often cited as evidence that consumers have conﬁrmatory bias–i.e. a taste for information that
conﬁrms their prior beliefs. We simply note that the evidence on evaluating the quality of information sources is
equally consistent with a Bayesian model.
9Other evidence comes from the 2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic World (The Gallup Organization, 2002). Respon-
dents in nine Islamic countries were asked to report whether each of the following ﬁve descriptions applies to CNN:
has comprehensive news coverage; has good analyses; is always on the site of events; has daring, unedited news; has
unique access to information. In our supplemental appendix, we show that an index of these quality assessments is
strongly correlated with respondents’ reported favorability toward the US. To deal with the possibility of reverse-
causality, we also construct a proxy for favorability based on respondents’ reported religiosity and show that this also
has a strong correlation with quality assessments.
72.3 The Inﬂuence of Consumer Priors on Media Reports
A large body of anecdotal evidence suggests a connection between consumers’ prior beliefs and
media ﬁrms’ slant. Consider, for example, Ames’ (1938) description of the problem faced by
southern newspaper editors in their coverage of lynching: “As individuals, they are unanimously
opposed to mob violence but, as editors who are caught in the general atmosphere of a given trade
territory, they do not reﬂect their own ideas but those of the people upon whose goodwill their
papers depend for revenue.” The result of this pressure was that southern editorials in the period
almost universally condoned lynchings.
A more recent example is the reported diﬀerence in coverage of the war in Iraq between U.S.
networks and Arabic-language news channels such as Al Jazeera. As Lieutenant Josh Rushing, an
American press oﬃcer, explains in the documentary Control Room,“ I tb e n e ﬁts Al Jazeera to play
to Arab nationalism because that’s their audience, just like Fox plays to American patriotism for
the exact same reason” (Turan, 2004).
Even within ag i v e nﬁrm slant can vary depending on the audience. For example, CNN’s do-
mestic cable channel broadcasts quite diﬀerent content from CNN International, which is broadcast
worldwide. Chris Cramer, president of CNN International, writes that their audience “expects us
to have a non-U.S. viewpoint.” The diﬀerence is also illustrated by coverage in the aftermath of
September 11: the domestic channel prominently displayed an American ﬂag during its broadcasts
while the international broadcasts quickly dropped the ﬂag (Kempner, 2001).
Turning to more systematic evidence, newspaper endorsements of presidential candidates display
a pattern of conformity to local political opinion. As ﬁgure 2 shows, in the 2000 U.S. presiden-
tial election, Bush’s share of the two-party vote was considerably lower in richer states (Glaeser,
Ponzetto and Shapiro, 2004). Bush received almost 60 percent of the two-party vote among states
in the lowest income quartile, as against just over 40 percent in the states in the highest quartile. As
the ﬁgure illustrates, newspaper endorsements displayed a similar pattern, with almost 90 percent
endorsing Bush in the bottom quartile and less than 55 percent in the top quartile. Although this
graph is by no means conclusive, it certainly suggests a signiﬁcant connection between consumer
beliefs and media slant.
Existing work in political science also suggests a correlation between the editorial position of
8newspapers and the views of their readers. For example, Dalton, Beck and Huckfeldt (1998) show
survey evidence from the 1992 presidential election suggesting that the editorial stance of local
newspapers is correlated with local perceptions of candidates. Erikson (1976) documents a similar
relationship using aggregate data on voting patterns in the 1960s. In Gunther’s (1992) analysis of
national survey data, he ﬁnds that only two percent of respondents had political views categorized
as “very distant” from those of their primary newspaper.
3 Media Bias in a Monopoly
In this section we present a simple model in which a single media ﬁrm reports to homogeneous
consumers. There is a binary state of the world S ∈ {L,R} and a large population of consumers
who must each choose a binary action A ∈ {L,R} which gives payoﬀ 1 if A = S and payoﬀ 0
otherwise.10 We assume that consumers and the ﬁrm place prior probability θ and θF, respectively,
on the true state being R.11
At the beginning of the game, the ﬁrm receives a signal s ∈ {l,r} about the true state, whose
distribution depends on the ﬁrm’s quality. With probability λ,t h eﬁrm is “high quality” and has
a signal that perfectly reveals the true state. With probability (1 − λ),t h eﬁrm is “normal,” and
has an imperfect but informative signal distributed according to










and θF ∈ (1 − π,π). These restrictions ensure that the ﬁr m ’ sb e s tg u e s sa st ot h e
true state will depend on its signal and also that its signal will be valuable to consumers.12 The
10We follow much of the previous literature in modeling the information provided by media ﬁr m sa sa ni n f o r m a t i v e
signal about some unknown state of the world, and assuming that consumers value this information because they
face some decision whose payoﬀs are connected with the true state. This could represent actual decisions that depend
on the news, either with large instrumental consequences (whether to join a terrorist group opposing the United
States) or with minor consequences (what position to support in an argument with friends). It could also represent
consumers who value information intrinsically as in Grant, Kajii and Polak (1998).
11Although we will allow for the possibility that θ = θ
F, the choice to specify ﬁrm and consumer beliefs separately
rather than assuming a common prior does aﬀe c tt h er e s u l t ss l i g h t l yb e c a u s ei tm e a n st h ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c sw e
present on θ will hold the ﬁrm prior constant. As we point out below, however, the comparative statics would only
be strengthened if we moved ﬁrm and consumer priors together.
12In the case where π<θ
F,t h eﬁr m ’ sb e s tg u e s si st h a tt h et r u es t a t ei sR regardless of its signal. We would want
to deﬁne “bias” in this case to be the probability that the ﬁrm’s report deviates from its best guess of the true state
9assumption that θ ≥ 1
2 is without loss of generality and serves to limit the set of cases we need to
consider.




.N o r m a lﬁrms are free to report
either ˆ l or ˆ r, and we write a normal ﬁrm’s strategy conditional on its signal by σs (ˆ s)=P r( ˆ s | s).
Without loss of generality, we will restrict attention to strategies with σr (ˆ r) ≥ σl (ˆ r) (cases where
this does not hold are equivalent to a relabeling of ˆ l and ˆ r). We assume that high quality ﬁrms
always report their signal (and thus the true state) honestly.13
These assumptions treat bias as pure distortion of the facts. In reality, of course, news sources
may slant information by reporting some facts and omitting others, by changing the order in which
facts are presented, by presenting sources as more or less credible, or by using language with
positive or negative connotations. Note, however, that in all of these cases, diﬀerent slants convey
information to consumers about what the ﬁrm believes is the true state of the world. For example,
Al Jazeera’s opening paragraph about the Samarra incident uses evidence selectively to imply
that the American attack harmed civilians. What is important for modelling is the information
conveyed in such a report, not the form the communication takes. In this sense, our model could
be a useful approximation to many technologies for bias, provided that these diﬀerent strategies
involve conveying diﬀerent impressions about the facts underlying the news story.14
Consumers choose whether or not to purchase the ﬁrm’s product and thus learn the value
of ˆ s. Rather than specify the pricing and proﬁt structure in detail, we make two reduced-form
assumptions: (i) all consumers purchase the product in equilibrium; (ii) a change in the distribution
of ˆ s (conditional on the true state) that increases consumers’ willingness to pay for the ﬁrm’s report
does not reduce consumer welfare and strictly increases ﬁrm proﬁts. These assumptions would hold,
for example, in a model where the ﬁrm sets a monopoly price and extracts all of the consumer
surplus.15
(the proper deﬁnition with respect to welfare). Bias would therefore involve the ﬁrm reporting ˆ l “too often” rather
than ˆ r t o oo f t e na si nt h ec a s ew ew i l la n a l y z e .H o w e v e r ,t h ek e yc o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c s ,t h a tﬁrm reports are correlated
with consumer priors and that bias decreases with feedback, would remain unchanged.
13Allowing both types to have discretion would complicate the exposition and lead the model to have multiple
equilibria in general. As we discuss in more detail in the supplemental appendix, however, the equilibrium we analyze
in which high types report truthfully is in fact the unique equilibrium of the more general model under an intuitive
stability criterion.
14In the supplemental appendix, we extend the model to allow for a continuous underlying signal, which approxi-
mates the case where ﬁrms receive several signals each period and choose which to print and which to omit.
15Alternatively, we could relax assumption (i) and allow the number of consumers who buy the ﬁrm’s product to
10After making the purchase decision and possibly learning ˆ s, each consumer chooses an action
A. Note that if consumers received utility from this action immediately, they would also know the
true state. Since we wish to model feedback about the truth explicitly, we assume consumers do not
receive utility until the end of the game, but all consumers immediately learn the true state with
probability μ ∈ [0,1]. Letting X ∈ {L,R,0} denote the feedback received, with X =0indicating
the case of no feedback, we will abuse notation slightly and denote by λ(ˆ s,X) a consumer’s posterior
probability that the ﬁrm is high quality given a report of ˆ s and feedback of X.
Finally, we assume that the ﬁrm receives a continuation payoﬀ
P
i f (λi),w h e r ef is a continuous
and strictly increasing function of its argument and λi is the posterior belief of consumer i.T h i s
could easily be derived by assuming a second period with exactly the same structure as the game
just described. Second period proﬁts would then be increasing in λi because each consumers’
expected gain from learning ˆ s will be higher the greater the probability the ﬁrm is high quality.
It can also be generated by a repeated structure in which overlapping generations of consumers
interact with a long-lived ﬁrm (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2005).
The timing of the game is summarized in ﬁgure 3. Note that the structure of the game implies
that the ﬁrm’s choice of a report ˆ s only aﬀects its objective function via the continuation payoﬀs
f (λi). Therefore, any ˆ s played in equilibrium must maximize the expectation of the continuation
payoﬀ over possible realizations of the consumer feedback.
3.1 Inferring quality from content
As a ﬁrst step to analyzing the outcome of this game, we consider how a consumer’s posterior belief
about ﬁrm quality depends on the ﬁrm’s strategy, the accuracy of its signal, π,a n dt h ec o n s u m e r ’ s
prior, θ. We focus for now on the case when consumers do not receive feedback.
Consider the posterior after a report of ˆ r and no feedback, λ(ˆ r,0). Setting aside the degenerate
case where the ﬁrm always reports ˆ l, this is a strictly increasing function of the likelihood ratio:
Pr(ˆ r | high)
Pr(ˆ r | normal)
=
θ
θ[σr (ˆ r)π + σl (ˆ r)(1− π)] + (1 − θ)[σr (ˆ r)(1− π)+σl (ˆ r)π]
.
depend on the expected value of the information in the ﬁrm’s report. A ﬁrm that set a zero price but extracted
revenues from advertising would then be better oﬀ the more useful its reports were expected to be.
11The key observation that drives many of the results below is that the more consumers’ prior
beliefs favor the state R, the more highly they will rate the quality of a ﬁrm that reports ˆ r.T o
see this, note that the derivative of the likelihood ratio with respect to θ has the same sign as
σr (ˆ r)(1− π)+σl (ˆ r)π, which is strictly positive under our maintained assumption that π<1.
Intuitively, as θ increases, the probability that a high type reports ˆ r increases faster than the
probability that a normal type reports ˆ r, since the latter’s report is more weakly related to the true
state. This makes ˆ r a better indicator of quality.
We can also see immediately that the likelihood ratio is strictly decreasing in both σr (ˆ r) and
σl (ˆ r) (since increasing these makes ˆ r a better indicator that the ﬁrm is normal). It is also weakly
decreasing in π (strictly if θ>1
2 and σr (ˆ r) >σ l (ˆ r)) since increasing π makes normal ﬁrms more
likely to receive a signal of r and thus more likely to report ˆ r, but does not aﬀect the distribution
of the high type’s reports.
Applying the same logic to beliefs after a report of ˆ l,w ea r r i v ea tl e m m a1 .
Lemma 1 Suppose that normal ﬁrms report both ˆ r and ˆ l with positive probability and that θ>1
2.




is strictly decreasing in θ, and strictly increasing in σr (ˆ r) and σl (ˆ r).F i n a l l y ,λ(ˆ r,0) is decreasing




is increasing in π, strictly whenever σr (ˆ r) >σ l (ˆ r).
3.2 Two special cases
To ﬁx ideas, we treat ﬁrst the special cases of no feedback (μ =0 )a n dp e r f e c tf e e d b a c k( μ =1 ). In
the no feedback case, the consumer’s posterior on the ﬁrm’s quality will be λ(ˆ s,0), which depends




.T os e et h i s ,n o t et h a t









=1 , a contradiction.
In order for the posterior to be independent of the ﬁrm’s report, it must be the case that, from
the consumer’s perspective, the equilibrium distributions of the high and normal types’ signals are
the same. This requires that the normal ﬁrm report ˆ r with probability θ and ˆ l with probability
(1 − θ). Note that this immediately rules out the normal ﬁrm truthfully reporting its signal, since
at r u t h f u ln o r m a lﬁrm reports ˆ r with probability (1 − θ)(1− π)+θπ < θ.
12There are many possible strategies for the normal ﬁrm which would cause its signal to have the
necessary distribution, and thus many possible equilibria.16 Since the ﬁrm must distort its signal
in a way that increases the overall probability of reporting ˆ r, all of these will involve some garbling
of the signal l (that is σl (ˆ r) > 0). For now, we will focus on the most informative equilibrium–the
one in which the ﬁrm does not simultaneously garble r signals.17 We show below that with even a
small probability of feedback, μ, the model has a unique equilibrium, and that the one considered
here is the limit of these unique equilibria as μ → 0.
In equilibrium, then, the ﬁrm biases its signal in the direction of consumers’ prior.18 Using
lemma 1, we can see immediately that the intensity of this bias, σ∗
l (ˆ r), will be increasing in the




, thus making it more
attractive to report ˆ r; σl (ˆ r) must then increase to restore equilibrium. The same logic shows that
increasing π reduces the intensity of bias. Intuitively, since R is the most likely state, a normal
ﬁrm with a more accurate signal is more likely to report ˆ r, and so requires less distortion to match
the high type’s signal. Finally, note that since the prior on quality λ cancels out in the equilibrium




, bias will be independent of λ. Therefore, as is common in reputation-
based models, even an arbitrarily small chance that the ﬁrm is high-type is suﬃcient to pin down
its reporting incentives (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982).
Consider, next, the special case in which the consumer receives feedback with certainty (μ =1 ).
Because any disagreement between feedback and report implies that the ﬁrm must be the normal
type, the ﬁrm will always prefer to match the feedback if possible. Intuitively, this will mean the
ﬁrm should report whichever state it believes is most likely after seeing its signal, s.S i n c ew eh a v e
assumed that the signal is suﬃciently strong to outweigh the ﬁrm’s prior (i.e. that π>θ F > 1−π),
this will lead to truthful reporting.
16For example, there is a pure babbling equilibrium in which normal ﬁrms randomly choose ˆ r with probability θ
and ˆ l with probability 1 − θ (independently of s.)
17It is straightforward to show that this is the equilibrium that maximizes the probability that the consumer chooses
the correct action, from the perspective of the consumer’s prior θ.
18In this simple case, we can solve for the bias explicitly. Equilibrium requires that:
Pr(ˆ r | normal)=σr (ˆ r)[θπ +( 1− θ)(1− π)] + σl (ˆ r)[θ(1 − π)+( 1− θ)π]=θ
Setting σr (ˆ r)=1 ,w eh a v e :
σl (ˆ r)=
(2θ − 1)(1 − π)
θ(1 − π)+( 1− θ)π
.
It is straightforward to check that this is increasing in θ and decreasing in π.
13This argument would be exactly correct if the gain in continuation payoﬀ from correctly match-
ing the R state were equal to the gain from correctly matching the L state. This is not ap r i o r iobvi-
ous, since the consumer’s judgments will depend on her conjecture about the normal ﬁrm’s strategy.





This would mean the ﬁr mm i g h th a v ea ni n c e n t i v et od e v i a t ea n dr e p o r tˆ r after seeing a signal of
l but would always report truthfully after seeing r. But this would imply that normal ﬁrms are





contradiction. From this logic it follows that the only equilibrium is honest reporting. Note that
t h i si sa l s ot h em o s ti n f o r m a t i v es t r a t e g y ,i nt h es e n s et h a ti tm o s te ﬃciently conveys the ﬁrm’s
information to the consumer.
3.3 Equilibrium reporting
We turn next to a formal treatment of the more general case of μ ∈ (0,1).T h e ﬁrm’s expected
payoﬀ is essentially a weighted average of the two special cases described above. With probability
(1 − μ), the consumer receives no additional information about the true state, and forms a posterior
based on her prior beliefs and her conjectures about the ﬁrm’s strategy. With probability μ,a
feedback report arrives, and the consumer can base her judgment of the ﬁr m ’ sq u a l i t yo nt h et r u e
state. Because the equilibrium conditional on feedback involves truthful reporting, we would expect
equilibrium bias in the general case to be decreasing in μ.
Formally, we can write the expected gain to reporting ˆ r rather than ˆ l after seeing signal s as
∆(s)=( 1− μ)∆nf + μ∆f (s),
where






∆f (s)=θF (s)[f (λ(ˆ r,R)) − f (0)] −
¡











(We abuse notation slightly and let θF (s) represent the ﬁrm’s posterior on the true state after
seeing s.) Note that the two terms in square brackets are the gain to correctly matching the R
14and L states respectively. These follow from the fact that a ﬁrm that fails to match the feedback




= λ(ˆ r,L)=0 .N o t et h a ts i n c eθF (r) >θ F (l) and
so ∆f (r) > ∆f (l), the gain to reporting ˆ r (ˆ l) is strictly larger (smaller) after seeing r than after
seeing l.
To gain some intuition for the comparative statics, suppose we begin from the case of perfect
feedback (μ =1 ) in which normal ﬁrms report their signals truthfully. Because a truthful normal
ﬁrm reports ˆ r less often than a high quality ﬁrm, we know that ∆nf > 0–if there were no feedback
the ﬁrm would want to deviate and report ˆ r after seeing l. Truthful reporting also implies that




and θF (l) < 1
2–conditional on feedback, the ﬁrm strictly
prefers to report l signals truthfully.
Consider, now, what happens as we decrease μ.F o r a ﬁrm that saw a signal l, this shifts
weight from the negative term ∆f (l) to the positive term ∆nf, decreasing the net gain to reporting
truthfully. As long as ﬁrm strategies don’t change, neither ∆f (l) nor ∆nf changes with μ,s ow e
will eventually reach a value of μ strictly greater than 0 where ∆(l)=0 .I f μ falls beyond this
point, the ﬁrm will strictly prefer to report ˆ r even after seeing l. It cannot be an equilibrium for the
ﬁrm to always report ˆ r because in this case reporting ˆ l w o u l dl e a dc o n s u m e r st ob e l i e v et h eﬁrm was
high quality for sure.19 The ﬁrm must therefore begin garbling l signals with a small probability–
this increases the probability that a normal ﬁrm reports ˆ r, causing the net reputational payoﬀ to
reporting ˆ r to fall. There will thus be a range of high μ where the ﬁrm reports truthfully, and a
range of lower μ where the ﬁrm plays a mixed strategy deﬁned by the condition ∆(l)=0 .I nt h i s
range, the ﬁrm biases its signal toward consumer priors and the probability of bias is decreasing in
μ.
It is easy to see that when the ﬁrm is playing a mixed strategy, the bias will also be increasing





changes, this provides a strict incentive to report ˆ r a n di no r d e rt or e s t o r ee q u i l i b r i u m
the ﬁrm must garble l signals into ˆ r more often.
19Making this argument precise requires us to handle the zero probability event that the ﬁrm deviates and reports
ˆ l but then the consumer receives feedback that the true state was R. We discuss the formalities in the proof of
proposition 1.
20Note that if we assumed that the ﬁrm and consumers had identical priors, then θ
F (s) and hence ∆
f (s) would
be increasing in θ, thus strengthening the comparative static on θ.
15Given the general form we have assumed for the continuation payoﬀ, there is no clear com-
parative static with respect to π.21 However, in the limit as π approaches 1,an o r m a lﬁrm’s
signal becomes nearly as accurate as that of the high type, so that the normal ﬁrm’s reputational
incentives no longer favor distortion and honest reporting becomes the unique equilibrium strategy.
T h ec o m p l e t ec h a r a c t e r i z a t i o no fe q u i l i b r i u mi sg i v e ni np r o p o s i t i o n1 ,w h i c hi sp r o v e di nt h e
appendix. Note that the equilibrium reporting strategy is now unique–with even arbitrarily little
feedback, the ﬁrm will choose the most informative strategy to try to match the conditional distri-
bution of the high type’s reports. Note too that since the ﬁrm only garbles l signals, the limit of
these equilibria as μ → 0 is the one discussed for the case of no feedback above.
Proposition 1 The unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium reporting strategy is for a normal ﬁrm
to report r signals truthfully and to misrepresent l signals with probability σ∗
l (ˆ r) ∈ [0,1).T h i s
probability is weakly increasing in θ, strictly whenever σ∗




,t h e r ee x i s t s
μ∗ ∈ (0,1) such that this probability is zero for μ ≥ μ∗ and is positive and strictly decreasing in μ
for μ<μ ∗.T h el i m i to fσ∗
l (ˆ r) as π → 1 is zero.
To make clearer how the equilibrium works, ﬁgure 4 shows the equilibrium bias as a function
of θ for two diﬀerent values of μ.W h e nμ is very close to zero, there is bias for almost all θ and it
is strictly increasing in θ.A sμ increases the bias falls, and there is a range of low θ for which the
equilibrium is truth-telling.
3.4 Welfare
Because we have modeled bias as a garbling of the ﬁrm’s signal, it should be immediately clear
that consumers’ willingness to pay for an unbiased signal would be strictly higher than for a biased
signal. Recall that we have assumed a change in the distribution of ˆ s that increases consumers’
willingness to pay for the ﬁrm’s report does not reduce consumer welfare, and strictly increases
ﬁrms’ proﬁts in the ﬁrst period. This means eliminating bias cannot make consumers worse oﬀ
(from the perspective of the consumer’s prior), and that it strictly increases ﬁrm proﬁts in the ﬁrst





. Depending on the shape of the function f(), this could either increase or decrease ∆
f (l),a n ds ot h e
net eﬀect on the incentive to report ˆ r is ambiguous.
16period.22
The other element of welfare to consider is the eﬀect of eliminating bias on the ﬁrm’s expected
continuation payoﬀ, where the expectation is taken with respect to the ﬁrm’s prior θF.T h i s i s
more subtle because reducing bias would improve the accuracy of consumers’ inferences about
quality. This would tend to increase the continuation payoﬀs of high quality ﬁrms and decrease the
continuation payoﬀso fn o r m a lﬁrms. Importantly, however, the magnitude of this learning eﬀect
will be small if the change in consumer beliefs about quality is small. This will be true in particular
if λ (the prior probability that the ﬁrm is high quality) is close to zero. To see this, observe that
since the normal ﬁrm reports both ˆ r and ˆ l with positive probability in equilibrium, there is no
event that reveals the ﬁrm to be high quality for sure. Therefore, as λ → 0,t h ep o s t e r i o r sλ(ˆ s,X)
become arbitrarily close to zero for all ˆ s and X. This means that the change in continuation payoﬀs
when bias is eliminated will approach zero.
We can thus state the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the equilibrium bias σ∗
l (ˆ r) is bounded away from zero in a neighbor-
hood of λ =0 . Then for small λ consumers would be weakly better oﬀ and the ﬁrm strictly better
oﬀ if the ﬁrm were required to report its signal truthfully.
It is easy to ﬁnd parameters for which the equilibrium bias is indeed bounded away from zero
around λ =0 . Recall that in the model with no feedback we showed that bias in the most informative
equilibrium was independent of λ and also that this was the limit of the full model’s equilibria as
μ → 0. It is also easy to see that the bias will be continuous in λ. For any θ>1
2 we can therefore
ﬁnd μ small enough that the limit of bias as λ → 0 is strictly positive.
4 Competition and Endogenous Feedback
Thus far we have taken the probability of feedback, μ, to be exogenous. This was meant to capture
a variety of ways that consumers might obtain additional information ex post–direct experience,
22Note as an aside that we have not assigned consumers a continuation payoﬀ that depends on their beliefs about
the ﬁrm’s quality. In a model where future interactions were deﬁned explicitly, we might expect consumers to be
better oﬀ the more they learned about ﬁrm quality. But eliminating bias must also at least weakly increase this
payoﬀ, since an unbiased signal provides strictly more information about the ﬁrm’s type, and so we would still ﬁnd
a strict increase in overall willingness to pay.
17contact with friends, and so forth. In this section, we explore a speciﬁc case in more detail: feedback
that is provided by competing media ﬁrms. We discuss the kinds of incentives that would lead
competing ﬁrms to provide accurate feedback in equilibrium and show that increasing competition
will tend to decrease reporting bias.
We assume that there are J ﬁrms in the market. One of these ﬁrms has a “scoop” on the true
state of the world–this means that the ﬁrm receives a possibly noisy signal of the true state s and
reports it exactly as the monopoly ﬁrm did in the last section. That is, if the scoop ﬁrm is high
quality (with probability λ) it receives a perfectly accurate signal and reports it honestly; if it is
normal, it receives a noisy signal equal to the true state with probability π and is free to report
either ˆ r or ˆ l.23 At the end of the game, the ﬁrm receives a continuation payoﬀ equal to
P
i f (λi).
We extend the model by adding a “feedback stage” in which the remaining J − 1 ﬁrms observe
the scoop ﬁrm’s report and also learn the true state with certainty. Each of these ﬁrms j then




. We continue to assume that there is an exogenous
probability ˜ μ>0 that the true state is revealed after all reports have been made.
In specifying consumer behavior, we want to capture the idea that increasing the number of
competing ﬁrms makes it more likely that consumers will read a feedback report ex post.W e
continue to assume for simplicity that all consumers read the scoop ﬁrm’s report and that they
must choose their action A immediately after reading it. We then assume that each consumer
can choose one of the J − 1 feedback reports or the outside option of reading none of them, which
provides some exogenous constant level of utility. The utility of reading each of the feedback reports
includes an i.i.d. random component with full support, so that the probability that each consumer
reads at least one feedback report, denoted φ(J), is strictly increasing in J and approaches one as
J →∞ .
O b s e r v et h a ti fa l lJ − 1 ﬁrms report the true state accurately in the feedback stage, the as-
sumptions we have made mean the scoop ﬁrm’s problem will be exactly equivalent to the monopoly
problem analyzed above–it chooses its report to maximize its reputation knowing consumers will
23Implicitly, we are assuming that the ﬁrm with the scoop always makes a report, but in principle we could
endogenize this choice. Of course, a ﬁrm that knows it is the normal type might prefer not to make a report, so as
to avoid making an error and revealing its type. This temptation would be especially strong if consumers do not
know which ﬁrm has the scoop. On the other hand, if high types always make a report when they have the scoop,
then there will be reputational incentives to make a report even if consumers do not know which ﬁrm has the scoop.
Understanding how these trade-oﬀs play out in equilibrium is an interesting issue beyond the scope of this paper.
18either have no feedback about the truth or learn the true state with certainty. The only diﬀerence
is that the probability of feedback will now be a strictly increasing function of J.P r o p o s i t i o n 1
thus implies that given truthful reporting, bias is weakly decreasing in J, and strictly decreasing
in J whenever the equilibrium calls for positive bias.
This observation treats competing ﬁrms as a mechanical device whose reports are exogenously
ﬁxed to perfectly reveal the true state. But reputational incentives such as those that drive our
earlier results can also lead competing ﬁrms to uncover the true state and to report it truthfully.
To see this, assume that each of the J ﬁrms may be high quality with probability λ,a n dt h a te a c h
ﬁrm j receives a continuation payoﬀ
P
i f (λij),w h e r eλij is consumer i’s posterior on j’s quality
and f() is strictly increasing. Assume that in the feedback stage, high quality ﬁrms always report
the true state honestly, but that normal ﬁrms can choose their reports freely. Each normal ﬁrm j
will choose its feedback report ˜ sj to maximize the ex post perception of its quality knowing that
there is a probability μ that consumers receive exogenous feedback. Note that the game between
a feedback ﬁrm and its readers is identical to our monopoly model above, with the restriction that
the normal type knows the true state for sure rather than having a noisy signal (π =1 ).
It then follows almost immediately from proposition 1 that the unique equilibrium is for all
feedback ﬁrms to report the true state honestly. We showed that the limit of the unique equilibria
as π → 1 is honest reporting. The only complication at π =1is that if consumers expect a
ﬁrm to report honestly the event that its report disagrees with the exogenous feedback becomes a
zero probability event. Assuming that their belief in this case is that the ﬁrm is normal for sure
easily supports the equilibrium. Any other candidate equilibrium would have positive equilibrium
probabilities at all nodes and would be ruled out by the the same argument that established
uniqueness for π close to 1.
Proposition 3 Let ¯ μ =˜ μ+(1− ˜ μ)φ(J) denote the total probability that a given consumer receives
feedback about the true state. Then in equilibrium all feedback ﬁrms report truthfully, and the
scoop ﬁrm plays the equilibrium strategy of the monopoly game with feedback probability μ =¯ μ.
Equilibrium bias is therefore weakly decreasing in the number of ﬁrms J (strictly whenever there is
positive bias in equilibrium) and zero for J suﬃciently large.
19This proposition is straightforward because the feedback ﬁrms are only motivated by their own
reputations. Their only incentive is thus to ensure that their reports match any feedback consumers
receive ex post. To highlight the importance of this independence, we now consider the opposite
extreme where the J ﬁrms are jointly owned, a case of particular interest in the policy debate. We
assume that the ﬁrms are either all high quality (with probability λ) or all normal, so reputation is
formed at the level of the owner. High quality ﬁrms always report the true state truthfully in both
the scoop and feedback stages. We assume that the owner receives a continuation payoﬀ
P
i f (λi)
where λi is consumer i’s posterior on the ﬁrms’ joint quality and f() is strictly increasing.
We ﬁrst show that the unique equilibrium in the feedback stage is for normal ﬁrms to conﬁrm
the report of the scoop ﬁrm regardless of the true state. To see that this is an equilibrium, suppose
consumers expect this strategy and consider a (normal) ﬁrm that is reporting in the feedback stage.
B e c a u s eb o t hh i g hq u a l i t ya n dn o r m a lﬁr m sa l w a y sc o n ﬁrm, consumers’ beliefs about quality will
remain strictly greater than zero if the ﬁrm follows its strategy of repeating the scoop ﬁrm’s report
and there is no exogenous feedback. This occurs with positive probability since μ<1.I f t h e
ﬁrm deviates and contradicts the report we assign consumers the belief that the ﬁrm is normal for
sure regardless of the exogenous feedback. The ﬁrm will then strictly prefer to conﬁrm since if it
contradicts it receives the lowest possible reputation for sure. To see that the equilibrium is unique
consider an alternative in which a feedback ﬁrm contradicts the scoop ﬁrm’s report with positive
probability. Consumers must assign a posterior of zero when they see a contradiction. A ﬁrm whose
strategy called for it to contradict would therefore strictly prefer to deviate since consumers must
assign it a posterior strictly greater than zero if it conﬁrms and there is no feedback, an event that
occurs with positive probability.
Next, observe that given this equilibrium in the feedback stage, increasing the number of ﬁrms
has no eﬀect on the scoop ﬁrm’s decision. Both normal ﬁrms and high-quality ﬁrms always report
the same thing in the scoop and feedback stages, so consumers never change their quality assess-
ments based on the feedback-stage report. The decision of all J ﬁrms to jointly report either ˆ r
or ˆ l is thus exactly equivalent to the monopoly problem analyzed earlier. We therefore have the
following result:
Proposition 4 Suppose all ﬁrms are jointly owned. Then in equilibrium ﬁrms in the feedback
20stage always conﬁrm the scoop ﬁrm’s report, and the scoop ﬁrm plays the equilibrium strategy of
the monopoly game with feedback probability μ =˜ μ. Equilibrium bias is therefore independent of
the number of ﬁrms J.
The assumption that all ﬁr m sh a v et h es a m eq u a l i t yi si m p o r t a n tf o rt h i sr e s u l t . I fw er e l a x
this assumption, the eﬀe c to fj o i n to w n e r s h i pw i l ld e p e n do nt h er e l a t i v ew e i g h to ft h et w oﬁrms’
reputations in the owner’s continuation payoﬀ.
In the analysis above, we have shown that with independent ownership, truthful feedback report-
ing can be supported by ﬁrms’ desires to maintain their own reputations for quality. It is possible,
however, that feedback ﬁrms might also have an incentive to harm the reputation of the scoop ﬁrm,
say because the two ﬁrms’ products are viewed as substitutes in the continuation game. Intuitively,
such rivalrous incentives can have two competing eﬀects on the quality of ex-post feedback. On
the one hand, consider a case such as we have modelled above where feedback ﬁrms can misreport.
If the feedback ﬁrms were solely concerned with damaging the reputation of the scoop ﬁrm, this
would give them a motivation to lie and make it more diﬃcult to sustain an equilibrium where their
reports are fully revealing. On the other hand, suppose feedback reports are veriﬁable but costly to
issue. Then a feedback ﬁrm interested in damaging the scoop ﬁrm’s reputation wouldn’t bother to
pay the cost to conﬁrm a correct scoop report, but might be willing to undertake eﬀort to expose
an incorrect one. Therefore the stronger is the incentive to harm the scoop ﬁrm’s reputation, the
less likely an incorrect report is to go unchallenged. These kinds of competitive incentives might
exacerbate bias in a world of unveriﬁable feedback, but could help discipline it in a world where
feedback is veriﬁable but costly to report.
5 Heterogeneous Priors and Market Segmentation
In the model thus far, all consumers have identical beliefs about the state of the world, and con-
sequently any two consumers who see the same report and feedback will make identical inferences
about newspaper quality. This seems a reasonable starting point for thinking about diﬀerences in
slant across markets–for example, why Al Jazeera and CNN diﬀe r ,o rw h yl o c a ln e w s p a p e r sm a y
diﬀer in their political orientation. But in many key settings of interest, ﬁrms with diﬀerent biases
21compete in the same market. In this section, we extend the model to consider a case in which two
ﬁrms report to consumers with diﬀerent priors,24 and illustrate why media ﬁrms might segment
the market according to prior beliefs.25
We will assume there are two equally large groups of consumers, denoted L and R,w i t hp r i o r
beliefs about the true state 1 − θ and θ, respectively, where θ>1
2. For simplicity we suppose that
the ﬁrm’s prior is θF = 1
2, the average prior belief of the consumers. Each consumer can only view
one ﬁrm’s report, and we assume they choose to view the report that will provide the greatest
expected utility–that is, that maximizes the probability of choosing the correct action A.I nt h e
event that two newspapers provide the same expected utility, a consumer will randomize, choosing
each with equal probability. As before, all consumers receive feedback about the true state with
probability μ.
We make the same assumptions about the two ﬁr m st h a tw em a d ea b o u tt h em o n o p o l i s ta b o v e .
Each ﬁrm is high quality with probability λ i nw h i c hc a s ei ts e e st h et r u es t a t ea n dr e p o r t st r u t h f u l l y .
Otherwise, a ﬁrm is normal, it sees a signal equal to the true state with probability π,a n di tc a n
choose its report freely. Both types and signals are drawn independently across ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm
receives a continuation payoﬀ
P
i f (λi),d e ﬁned over consumers’ quality assessments λi,w h e r ef()
is strictly increasing.26
Consider ﬁrst how a consumer’s decision of which paper to read depends on her beliefs about
each ﬁrm’s equilibrium reporting strategy. Becausew eh a v em o d e l e db i a sa sp u r ed i s t o r t i o n ,w e
should expect it to reduce the value of a signal to all consumers. Importantly, however, the perceived
cost of bias will depend on a consumer’s type. A ﬁrm that biases its signals to the right–that is,
that sometimes distorts l signals but always reports r signals truthfully–will be relatively more
24See Morris (1995) for a discussion of the role of heterogeneous priors in economic theory, and Morris (1994) for
an application with heterogeneous priors.
25Mullainathan and Shleifer (forthcoming) point out a diﬀerent intuition for market segmentation, namely that
price competition leads ﬁrms to avoid oﬀering similar products.
26We note three points about the assumption on continuation payoﬀs. First, nothing would change if we let the
function f() diﬀer by ﬁr m ss ol o n ga si tw a ss t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gf o rb oth. Second, because we have assumed that
consumers can only see one ﬁrm’s report, the results would also not change if we let one ﬁrm’s continuation payoﬀ
depend on a consumer’s belief about both its own and its competitor’s quality (the ﬁrm only cares about the consumers
who see its report, and these consumers’ beliefs about its competitor will be constant). Finally, assuming f() is strictly
increasing does rule out some natural speciﬁcations of the continuation game. For example, suppose there were a
second period in which consumers chose whichever ﬁrm they believed to be higher quality (and ﬁrms received a ﬁxed
advertising revenue per consumer). Then f (λi) would be a step function with f
0 =0almost everywhere. What we
would require in this case is some stochastic component in consumer utility–a cost of time, utility from reading the
sports section, etc.–that would “smooth out” consumer demand.
22attractive to R-type consumers than to L-type consumers, because L-type consumers expect l
signals to arrive more often. We can see this formally by noting that a consumer who follows the
signal of a normal ﬁrm that biases l signals with probability σ∗ will choose the correct action with
probability π +( 1− π)σ∗ i ft h et r u es t a t ei sR and probability π (1 − σ∗) i ft h et r u es t a t ei sL.
Using her prior belief that the state is R with probability θ,a nR-type consumer would calculate
that if she follows the ﬁrm’s signal she will choose the correct action with probability π−σ∗ (π − θ).
An L-type consumer, on the other hand, would expect to choose the correct action with probability
π−σ∗ [π − (1 − θ)] which is strictly smaller. The same logic shows that a ﬁrm that biases its signals
to the left will be relatively more attractive to L-type consumers.27 If the two ﬁrms have equal
bias in opposite directions–if one distorts l signals with probability σ∗ > 0 and the other distorts
r signals with the same probability–the R-type consumers will strictly prefer the right-biased ﬁrm
and the L-type consumers will strictly prefer the left-biased ﬁrm.
We can then see immediately that there can be equilibria in which the consumer market is
completely segmented by type. Suppose for the moment that all type-R consumers buy from ﬁrm
1a n da l lt y p e - L consumers buy from ﬁrm 2. Then the equilibrium strategy of ﬁrm 1 will be that
of a monopolist in a market where all consumers have prior θ–that is, to distort l signals with
some probability and report r signals truthfully–and the equilibrium strategy of ﬁrm 2 will have
the same bias but in the opposite direction. If the monopoly strategy calls for distortion with any
positive probability, type-R consumers will indeed choose ﬁrm 1 and type-L consumers will choose
ﬁrm 2.
This is not the only equilibrium of the game, however. Consider what happens when a ﬁrm has
equal numbers of consumers of each type. Suppose consumers expect the ﬁrm to report honestly
and that they see no ex post feedback. If the ﬁrm reports ˆ r,t h eR-types will increase their estimate
of its quality (say to λhigh)a n dt h eL-types will decrease their estimate of its quality (say to λlow).
Its continuation payoﬀ per consumer will be [f (λhigh)+f (λlow)]/2. But because the problem is
symmetric, this will also be its payoﬀ if it reports ˆ l–the only diﬀerence is it will then be the L-types
who have posterior λhigh.T h eﬁrm must therefore be indiﬀerent about its report conditional on no
feedback. Since it strictly prefers to report truthfully conditional on feedback, truthful reporting
27The relationship between prior beliefs and the information value of binary signals is explored in detail by Suen
(2004).
23will be an equilibrium for any ﬁrm with equal numbers of each type. We can go further and show
that any ﬁrm with equal numbers of consumers of each type must report honestly in equilibrium.
To see this, suppose that a ﬁrm sometimes reports ˆ r after seeing l. Relative to the case of honest
reporting, this strictly reduces all consumers’ posteriors after an ˆ r report and strictly increases their
posteriors after an ˆ l report. Thus, the incentive to report ˆ l after l w o u l db ee v e ns t r o n g e rt h a n
when consumers expect honest reporting, and the ﬁrm would prefer to deviate from its presumed
strategy. The same argument shows the ﬁrm cannot report ˆ l after r.
There are then two types of equilibria with honest reporting. First, suppose all consumers of
both types will buy from ﬁrm 1. Then ﬁrm 2 will be indiﬀe r e n ta b o u ti t sr e p o r t( s i n c ei th a sn o
consumers) and ﬁrm 1, as we just observed, will report honestly. If ﬁr m2p l a y sa n ys t r a t e g yw i t h
positive probability of distortion, all consumers will indeed prefer to buy from ﬁrm 1. Second,
suppose consumers of both types divide evenly between the two ﬁrms. Then both ﬁrms will report
honestly, consumers will be indiﬀerent between them, and consumers will indeed divide evenly.
The proof of the following proposition establishes that these three types of equilibria are gener-
ically unique. The genericity argument is required because there is one other equilibrium conﬁg-
uration that is possible in principle: one consumer type strictly prefers one ﬁrm while the other
consumer type is indiﬀerent between the two. We show that if such an equilibrium does exist for
some payoﬀ functions f(), it will not exist for small perturbations of the payoﬀ functions.
Proposition 5 For generic continuation payoﬀs, the game with heterogeneous priors has three
types of equilibria:
1. A segmented equilibrium, in which one ﬁrm is read only by R-group consumers and biases
its reports toward ˆ r and the other is read only by L-group consumers and biases its reports
toward ˆ l. This type of equilibrium exists for any parameter values such that σ∗
l (ˆ r) > 0.
2. An eﬀective monopoly, in which one ﬁrm reports honestly and the other lies with positive
probability, and all consumers read the report of the honest ﬁrm. This type of equilibrium
exists for all parameter values.
3. An honest equilibrium,i nw h i c hb o t hﬁrms report honestly and consumers divide evenly
between them. This type of equilibrium exists for all parameter values.
24Observe that in the segmented equilibrium, the ﬁrms’ strategies are endowed with the comparative
statics described in proposition 1, since each ﬁrm is playing the monopoly strategy for its respective
consumer base. This means that as beliefs become more extreme (θ increases), the ﬁrms’ reporting
strategies tend to diverge, and that as feedback strengthens (μ increases) they tend to move back
toward honest reporting. Indeed, for high enough μ, the monopoly strategies call for honesty,
so that in these cases all (generic) equilibria involve consumers receiving as much information as
possible.
6 Evidence on the Determinants of Bias
In the model above, we argued that two factors should play a key role in determining the direction
and strength of bias: ex post feedback and competition. In this section, we review existing evidence
and present new evidence on both predictions.
6.1 Feedback
As proposition 1 shows, our model predicts that ex-post feedback about the true state of the world
will tend to reduce media bias. An extreme example of an issue where feedback is immediate
and unambiguous is weather reporting. Although the notion of bias in weather reporting seems
strange, consumers certainly have strong prior beliefs about the next day’s weather–a forecaster
who predicts snow in New Mexico in July would be viewed with suspicion. But since feedback is
immediate, this should not deter her from making such a prediction if she truly believes it to be
the most likely scenario.
In fact, studies of weather forecasters’ predictions reveal excellent reliability. Probability fore-
casts match up well with observed relative frequencies; i.e., a forecast of a 20 percent chance of
precipitation tends to be followed by precipitation roughly 20 percent of the time. Additionally,
reported conﬁdence intervals for temperatures show nearly exact coverage (Murphy and Winkler,
1977 and 1984). Given the fact that the weather is known with certainty soon after forecasters
make their predictions, it is not surprising that we ﬁnd little evidence of bias in predicting the
weather.
25Of course, weather diﬀers from politics not only because of the strength of feedback but because
people take actions with concrete and immediate consequences in response to forecasted conditions.
Some authors (such as Glaeser, 2004) have argued that psychological biases will have less inﬂu-
ence on decisions with larger stakes. The presence of such a force could allow theories based on
conﬁrmatory bias to accommodate the observation that weather reporting is relatively unbiased.
We therefore turn next to a forecasting environment with rapid feedback in which emotions run
high and concrete stakes tend to be low: sports picking by local newspaper columnists. We draw
on data collected by Boulier and Stekler (2003) on New York Times sports editors’ predictions
from 1994-2000. For each game, the dataset contains the opening betting line (as published in USA
Today) and the editors’ picks. If bias is driven primarily by consumers’ desire to hear felicitous
reports, a natural hypothesis is that the Times would favor the New York teams–the Jets and the
Giants–to win (relative to the betting market’s expectation). In contrast, because outcomes are
observed soon after reports are made, our model predicts little such bias in this context.
To investigate this issue we calculate a measure ˆ δi of the experts’ slant towards team i by
estimating a regression model of the form
winj = α + δi [(homej = i) − (awayj = i)] + γ (linej)+εj
where winj denotes whether the editor picked the home team to win game j, homej indexes the
home team in game j, awayj indexes the visiting team in game j,a n dlinej is a vector of dummy
variables representing deciles of the betting line.
Figure 5 presents graphically our estimates of δi for each team, measured relative to the Seattle
Seahawks (the experts’ least favored team over this time period). As the ﬁgure shows, the Giants
are picked more often than average and the Jets less often, but there is no evidence of overall
favoritism toward the New York teams. This fact is surprising if we start from taste-based theories
of bias, but is consistent with the implications of proposition 1 above.28
Evidence from ﬁnancial reporting also suggests a role for feedback in limiting media bias. Lim
28A similar test can be conducted using data collected by Avery and Chevalier (1999) on picks of six experts
published in the Boston Globe between 1983 and 1994. Results are in our supplemental appendix, and details of the
exercise are provided in notes to the ﬁgure. While the writers are more favorable to home team (the Patriots) than
average, the Patriots are not the experts’ most favored team, and are treated comparably to many other teams in the
league. Overall, this data shows limited evidence for a taste for conﬁrmation as a driving factor in sports reporting.
26(2001) presents evidence indicating that analysts’ forecasts of corporate earnings are more opti-
mistically biased for smaller ﬁrms and for ﬁrms with more volatile historical earnings and stock
returns (see also Das, Levine and Sivaramakrishnan, 1998). Although Lim interprets these ﬁndings
as evidence that analysts make optimistic forecasts so as to win favor with ﬁrms and obtain access
to non-public information, we propose our model as an alternative explanation. When earnings
are less volatile, inaccurate reporting is more easily detected, and so analysts concerned with their
reputation for high-quality reports will be less likely to bias their forecasts.
Relatedly, several authors have argued that biases in earnings forecasts become less severe as the
length of time between the publication of the forecast and the earnings announcement decreases (see
Kang, O’Brien and Sivaramakrishnan, 1994 and Raedy, Shane and Yang, 2003). Again, a model
with reputational concerns oﬀers a possible interpretation of this fact: When the announcement
comes quickly on the heels of the forecast, bias is more likely to be detected and to inﬂuence
consumer decisions about which forecast to purchase in the future.
6.2 Competition
Because competition increases the likelihood that erroneous reports will be exposed ex-post,o u r
model predicts that added competition will tend to reduce bias. The reaction to Dan Rather’s
report on President Bush’s service in the National Guard, discussed in more detail in section
2.1, provides one example of the role that competing media outlets can play in exposing ﬂaws in
journalism. Anecdotes about the impact of Al Jazeera’s relatively independent reporting on media
in the Arabic-speaking world provide another. As Otis (2003) reports, “Many experts contend that
Egyptian newspapers have improved dramatically in recent years. During the Six-Day War against
Israel in 1967, the heavily censored press largely ignored battleﬁeld defeats. Today, Al-Jazeera
and other television stations beam raw images of military conﬂicts into people’s homes, preventing
newspapers from straying too far from the truth.” To take a third example, when an American
civilian was beheaded by militants in Iraq, reporting of the story was more common in countries
with competitive media environments. In Syria, where all local press and television are state-
owned (Djankov, McLiesh, Nenova and Shleifer, 2003), newspapers completely ignored this event.
By contrast, in Lebanon, which has a relatively competitive press, most newspapers did report on
27the beheading (Associated Press, 2004). This fact seems to support the view that suppression and
distortion of information are less attractive when competition makes the truth likely to come out.29
For a more quantitative investigation of the eﬀects of competition on media bias, we have
obtained data from the 2000 Local News Archive (Kaplan and Hale, 2001). The dataset encodes
the characteristics of local election news coverage broadcast between 5:00pm and 11:35pm during
the 30 days prior to the general election on November 7, 2000. It covers 74 stations in 58 of the
top 60 media markets in the US. Most importantly for our purposes, it contains a coding of the
number of seconds of speaking time given to George W. Bush and Al Gore. By calculating the total
number of seconds given to each candidate by each station i, we can then construct the following









where bushi and gorei denote the number of seconds given to each candidate by station i.T h i s
measure takes on a value of 0 when Bush and Gore received equal time in local news coverage of
the election, and a value of .25 when only one candidate is given coverage. The average of biasi
across the stations in a market will serve as our measure of bias.
Given this measure, we can investigate whether the degree of bias is lower in markets with a
greater number of local news broadcasts, as predicted by the model. As table 1 shows, this is indeed
the case. Column (1) of the table indicates that one additional television station is associated with
a statistically signiﬁcant reduction in bias of about .006, which is equivalent to about one-third of a
standard deviation. As column (2) shows, this eﬀect is robust to the inclusion of controls for Census
region, so it is not merely driven by geographic diﬀerences in the thickness of markets. Column (3)
highlights that including population, an important determinant of the number of local broadcasts
(the correlation between log(population) and the number of news broadcasts is about .5), does
not substantially reduce the size of the competition eﬀect or eliminate its statistical signiﬁcance.
Finally, column (4) shows that the eﬀect is robust to an additional control for income per capita,
29Another example of the role of competition is the coverage of the allegations of torture in the Abu Ghraib prison
in Iraq. The CBS program 60 Minutes was the ﬁrst to obtain photos from the prison, but it delayed broadcasting
them for two weeks. The incentive to suppress the photos in this case was not consumer beliefs but direct pressure
from the government–Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ Richard Myers had personally asked Dan Rather not to
broadcast the photos. But what led them to ﬁnally be aired was competition: once CBS learned that Seymour Hersh
was working on the same story for the New Yorker, they decided to put the report on the air (Folkenﬂik, 2004).
28which could also drive diﬀerences across locations in the competitiveness of the news market.30
Several existing studies of bias in reporting also show eﬀects of competition consistent with
our model’s predictions. Dyck and Zingales (2003) argue that newspapers put less “spin” on their
reports of company earnings when many alternative sources of information are available. Lim (2001)
presents evidence from analysts’ earnings forecasts suggesting that bias is lower the more analysts
are providing reports on a given company.31 Gentzkow, Glaeser and Goldin (2004) document that
the emergence of independent (i.e. non-party-aﬃliated) newspapers in the United States was faster
in larger cities, suggesting a role for competition in encouraging the growth of more informative
news outlets.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
The model in this paper presents a new way to understand media bias. Bias in our model does not
arise from consumer preferences for conﬁrmatory information, reporters’ incentives to promote their
own views, or politicians’ ability to capture the media. Instead, it arises as a natural consequence
of ﬁrms’ desire to build a reputation for accuracy, and in spite of the fact that eliminating bias
could make all agents in the economy better oﬀ.
An advantage of our model is that it generates sharp predictions about where bias will arise and
when it will be most severe. We wish to highlight two policy implications of these results. The ﬁrst
concerns the regulation of media ownership. In the current debate over FCC ownership regulation
in the U.S., the main argument in favor of limits on consolidation has been the importance of
“independent voices” in news markets. Proposition 4 oﬀers one way to understand the potential
costs of consolidation: independently owned outlets can provide a check on each others’ coverage
and thereby limit equilibrium bias, an eﬀect that may be absent if the outlets are jointly owned.
As a second implication, the eﬀect of competition described by proposition 3 has important
implications for the conduct of public diplomacy. The U.S. government is currently engaged in a
debate about the most eﬀective way to counter what it sees as anti-American bias in the Arab media,
especially Al Jazeera. Eﬀorts along these lines have included condemnation of Al Jazeera by top
30The estimated eﬀect of competition is also robust to controlling for the average total amount of candidate speaking
time aired by stations in each market.
31See also Firth and Gift (1999).
29U.S. oﬃcials (Rumsfeld, 2001), appeals to the Emir of Qatar (who sponsors the network) to change
the tone of Al Jazeera’s coverage (Campagna, 2001), and the closing of Al Jazeera’s Baghdad oﬃce
by the U.S.-backed Alawi government in Iraq. Our model suggests a diﬀerent approach: supporting
the growing competitiveness of the Middle Eastern media market and in particular increasing the
availability of alternative news sources in local languages. Aside from the direct eﬀect on the beliefs
of those who watch these sources (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004), introducing more news outlets
could have the eﬀect of disciplining existing stations and reducing the overall amount of bias in the
region.
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Notes: Data from the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press’s 2002 News Media Believability
Survey. Exact wording for survey question on respondent political views:
In general, would you describe your political views as very conservative, conservative, mod-
erate, liberal, or very liberal?
Exact wording for survey question on media believability:
Now, I’m going to read a list. Please rate how much you think you can BELIEVE each
organization I name on a scale of 4 to 1. On this four point scale, “4” means you can believe
all or most of what the organization says. “1” means you believe almost nothing of what they
say. How would you rate the believability of {The Fox News CABLE Channel / National Public
Radio} on this scale of 4 to 1?










































Notes: Data on voting behavior taken from Federal Election Commission (http://www.fec.gov/elections.html).
Percent for Bush reﬂects percent of two-party vote. Data on state per capita income from USA Counties 1998
CD-ROM. Data on newspaper endorsements from Bush (www.georgewbush.com) and Gore (www.algore.com)
oﬃcial campaign sites; data posted at http://www.wheretodoresearch.com/Political.htm#Endorsements.
Percent for Bush reﬂects percent among papers endorsing either Bush or Gore.
36Figure 3 The timing of the monopoly game
Nature chooses firm type and state of the world 
Firm receives signal correlated with true state 
Firm makes a report 
Consumers update beliefs about true state based on report 
Consumers choose an action based on beliefs about true state 
With some probability, consumers learn true state 
Consumers update beliefs about firm quality based on firm’s 
report and feedback (if available) 
Firm receives continuation payoff depending on consumers’ 
assessments of its quality 




















Notes: Vertical axis shows equilibrium probability of reporting ˆ r given that the newspaper with the scoop
receives a signal of l. Horizontal axis shows prior probability θ. Dashed line shows equilibria for the limit
case of no feedback (μ =0 ). Solid line shows equilibria for the case of a positive probability of feedback
(μ = .5). Drawn for the case of f (x)=x, π = .7,a n dλ = .3.












































































































































































































































Notes: Data from Boulier and Stekler (2003). Dataset contains information on the picks of the New York
Times sports editor for NFL games in the 1994-2000 seasons, as well as the outcome of the game and the
betting line. The bar for team i represents the estimated coeﬃcient ˆ δi in a regression of the form
winj = α + δi [(homej = i) − (awayj = i)] + γ (linej)+εj
where winj denotes whether the editor picked the home team to win game j, homej indexes the home team
in game j, awayj indexes the visiting team in game j,a n dlinej is a vector of dummy variables representing
deciles of the betting line.
39Table 1 Competition and bias in local news coverage of the 2000 election





Number of local news -0.0057 -0.0064 -0.0062 -0.0062
broadcasts, 2002 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0031)
Census region controls? NO YES YES YES
log(population), 2000 -0.0006 -0.0004
(0.0043) (0.0053)
log(income per capita), 1999 -0.0013
(0.0188)
N 58 58 58 58
R2 0.0834 0.1747 0.1751 0.1752









where xi denotes the number of seconds given to candidate x by station i, with data taken from the Local
News Archive (Kaplan and Hale, 2001). Number of local news broadcasts reﬂects the number of stations
showing local news coverage at some time during the day as of July 2002, compiled from www.tvguide.com.
Data on population, income per capita, and Census region are taken from the U.S. Census, 2000.
40AA p p e n d i x : P r o o f s
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We show ﬁrst that it cannot be an equilibrium for the ﬁrm to distort r signals with positive




> 0). Recall from the text that the gain from reporting ˆ l
after r is strictly smaller than the gain from reporting ˆ l after l.I ft h eﬁrm sometimes reports ˆ l after
r it must therefore always report ˆ l after l.An o r m a lﬁrm would then be more likely to correctly




and thus, since θF (r) > 1
2, ∆f (r) > 0.













,w ea l s ok n o w∆nf > 0.T h eﬁrm would therefore strictly prefer to deviate and
report ˆ r after r. Any equilibrium must therefore have at most garbling of l signals into ˆ r.
Observe next that it cannot be an equilibrium for the ﬁrm to always garble l signals into ˆ r.
Suppose that consumers expected normal ﬁrms to always report ˆ r and consider a ﬁrm that sees a
signal of l.I f t h e ﬁrm deviates and reports ˆ l, a consumer that sees no feedback or that receives




=1 , since only high quality ﬁrms report ˆ l.
In these cases, the ﬁrm would prefer to deviate. The event a consumer sees ˆ l and receives feedback
that the state is R has zero probability in the proposed equilibrium, and so beliefs at this node can
be arbitrary. Suppose, in the worst case for the ﬁrm, that they assume that if this node is reached




=0 ). Payoﬀs from following the strategy are then:
(1 − μ)f (λ(ˆ r,0)) + μ
£
θF (l)f (λ(ˆ r,R)) +
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Payoﬀs from deviating are:
(1 − μ)f (1) + μ
£
θF (l)f (0) +
¡





Because λ(ˆ r,0) and λ(ˆ r,R) a r eb o t hs t r i c t l yl e s st h a no n ea n dθF (l) < 1
2 (since 1 − π<θ F <π ),
the ﬁrm strictly prefers to deviate.
Any equilibrium must therefore have a probability of distortion σ∗
l (ˆ r) ∈ [0,1). We now show
that the equilibrium σ∗
l (ˆ r) exists and is unique. Note ﬁrst that the payoﬀ to reporting ˆ r after
l, ∆(l), is strictly decreasing in the garbling probability σl (ˆ r). This follows from the fact that
increasing σl (ˆ r) decreases the posterior on quality after an ˆ r report and increases the posterior
after an ˆ l report (for any feedback), and that this is strict for no feedback or feedback that matches
the ﬁrm’s report. Now consider two cases. First, suppose that when consumers expect truth-telling,
∆(l) ≤ 0. Then truthful reporting is an equilibrium and it is unique because at any candidate
σl (ˆ r) > 0 we would have ∆(l) strictly negative and so the ﬁr mw o u l dp r e f e rt od e v i a t ea n da l w a y s
report ˆ l after l. Second, suppose that when consumers expect truth-telling, ∆(l) > 0. Then the
facts that (i) ∆(l) is strictly decreasing in σl (ˆ r),a n d( i i )∆(l) < 0 at σl (ˆ r)=1 , imply that there
is a unique σ∗
l (ˆ r) ∈ (0,1) such that ∆(l)=0when consumers expect σ∗
l (ˆ r).T h i sm i x e ds t r a t e g y
is then the unique equilibrium.
To derive the comparative statics with respect to θ, observe that for any μ ∈ (0,1),t r u t h f u l
reporting of r signals, and σl (ˆ r) ∈ [0,1), lemma 1 implies that ∆(l) is strictly increasing in θ.
Therefore the probability σ∗
l (ˆ r) must be increasing in θ in the mixed strategy range.




, that consumers expect truthful reporting
of r signals, and that we are at an equilibrium value of σl (ˆ r)–that is, either σl (ˆ r)=0or σl (ˆ r) > 0
and ∆(l)=0 .T h e n ∆(l) is strictly decreasing in μ. To see this, note ﬁrst that the payoﬀ to
41reporting ˆ r after l conditional on feedback (∆f (l)) must be strictly negative, since the ﬁrm believes
L to be the most likely state and the reward to correctly matching the L state is greater than the
reward for correctly matching the R state. Second, the payoﬀ conditional on no feedback (∆nf)





truth-telling, and the fact that ∆(l)=0if consumers expect a positive probability of distortion.
The signs of ∆f (l) and ∆nf also imply that if consumers expect truth-telling, ∆(l) is strictly
negative for μ =1and becomes strictly positive as μ → 0. There is therefore a unique μ∗ ∈ (0,1)
such that the equilibrium is truth-telling for μ ≥ μ∗ and a mixed strategy for μ<μ ∗,a n dt h e
probability of distortion in the mixed strategy range is strictly decreasing in μ.
For the limit result on π,n o t et h a ti fc o n s u m e r se x p e c tt h eﬁrm to report honestly, it is
straightforward to show that limπ→1 ∆nf =0and limπ→1 ∆f (l) < 0, which by continuity implies
that limπ→1 σ∗
l (ˆ r)=0 .¥
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
We ﬁrst show that each ﬁrm must distort at most one signal with positive probability. As in
the monopoly case, the expected payoﬀ to reporting ˆ r is strictly greater after a signal r than after
as i g n a ll. (The only way that seeing r rather than l aﬀects the ﬁrm’s expected continuation payoﬀ
is that it shifts the ﬁrm’s posterior on the true state toward R, increasing the expected return to
reporting ˆ r conditional on consumers receiving feedback.) Therefore a ﬁrm that sometimes reports
ˆ r after l must always report ˆ r after r. Similarly, the return to reporting ˆ l is strictly greater after a
signal l and so a ﬁrm that sometimes reports ˆ l after r must always report ˆ l after l.
Now, observe that there can logically be four types of equilibria:
1. Type-R consumers strictly prefer one ﬁrm and type-L consumers strictly prefer the other ﬁrm
2. Both consumer types strictly prefer the same ﬁrm
3. Both consumer types are indiﬀerent between the ﬁrms
4. One consumer type strictly prefers one ﬁrm and the other is indiﬀerent between the ﬁrms
The discussion in the text established (i) that segmented equilibria exist whenever σ∗
l (ˆ r) > 0
and are the only possible equilibria of the ﬁrst type; (ii) that eﬀective monopoly equilibria exist
and that these are the only equilibria of the second type; and (iii) that honest reporting equilibria
exist and that these are the only equilibria of the third type. To complete the proof we show that
equilibria of the fourth type will not exist generically.
Suppose without loss of generality that the L-type consumers have a strict preference for ﬁrm
1a n dt h eR-type consumers are indiﬀerent between the ﬁrms. Then ﬁrm 1’s customers are 2/3 L
types and 1/3 R types while ﬁrm 2’s customers are all R types. Therefore, ﬁr m2m u s tb ep l a y i n g
the monopoly strategy for R types, which will involve distorting l signals with some probability,
possibly 0. Denote this probability σ∗.I f σ∗ =0 , both types would either be indiﬀerent (if ﬁrm
1 reports honestly) or strictly prefer ﬁrm 2 (if ﬁrm 1 reports with bias), which contradicts our
assumption. Therefore we can restrict attention to cases where σ∗ > 0.
Note ﬁrst that ﬁrm 1 cannot be playing the same strategy as ﬁrm 2, because then L types would
also be indiﬀerent between the two ﬁrms. Firm 1 also cannot distort l signals with a diﬀerent non-
zero probability because then both types would either strictly prefer ﬁrm 1 (if the probability was
lower) or strictly prefer ﬁrm 2 (if the probability was higher). Firm 1 must therefore distort r
signals with some positive probability σ0. From the expression for consumer value derived in the
42t e x t ,w ec a ns e et h a tt om a k et h eR types indiﬀerent, σ0 will be deﬁned uniquely by the equation
π − σ0 [π − (1 − θ)] = π − σ∗ (π − θ).( 1 )
Note that this immediately implies σ0 > 0. In order for the strategy σ0 to be an equilibrium, ﬁrm 1
must be indiﬀerent about its report when consumers expect it to play σ0 and it observes a signal r.
Letting ∆f (r) denote the relative payoﬀ to reporting ˆ r after r conditional on feedback, and letting





























= ∆f (r).( 2 )
Equations 1 and 2 are a system with a single unknown, σ0, so there will not be a solution for generic
f().¥
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A Extensions and Generalizations
A.1 Consumer inferences about quality
In this extension, we show that the basic link between consumer priors and inferences about quality
holds in a larger class of information structures than the simple model considered in the paper.
That is, it is a robust property of Bayesian belief formation.
Suppose the true state of the world is S ∈ {L,R}. Information sources, which may be high
or low quality, make a report ˆ s ∈ D,w h e r eD is some set of possible reports. The density of a
high-quality report conditional on the state S is ¯ π (ˆ s;S) and the density of a low-quality report is
π(ˆ s;S).H e r e¯ π() and π() m a yb ee i t h e rP M F so rP D F ss ol o n ga sa n ym a s sp o i n t so f¯ π() are also
mass points of π().
We say that a value ˆ s supports R if ¯ π (ˆ s;R) > ¯ π (ˆ s;L)–i.e. if seeing report ˆ s from a high-quality
source provides information that R is the true state. We assume that the high-quality source is
uniformly more informative than the low-quality source in the sense that:





if ˆ s supports R;( 1 )
¯ π(ˆ s;L)




if ˆ s supports L.
Suppose that a consumer has prior probability θ that the true state is R, and prior probability λ
that the source is high quality. The following proposition characterizes how the report ˆ s inﬂuences
the consumer’s posterior estimate of quality λ(ˆ s).
Appendix Proposition 1 λ(ˆ s) is strictly increasing in θ if ˆ s supports R and strictly decreasing
in θ if ˆ s supports L.
Proof. The posterior on quality will be an increasing function of the likelihood ratio:
L =
¯ π (ˆ s;L)(1− θ)+¯ π (ˆ s;R)θ
π (ˆ s;L)(1− θ)+π (ˆ s;R)θ
∗E-mail: gentzkow@ChicagoGSB.edu, jmshapir@uchicago.edu.
1The derivative dL/dθ has the same sign as:
[π(ˆ s;L)(1− θ)+π(ˆ s;R)θ][¯ π (ˆ s;R) − ¯ π(ˆ s;L)]
− [¯ π(ˆ s;L)(1− θ)+¯ π(ˆ s;R)θ][π (ˆ s;R) − π(ˆ s;L)]
= π (ˆ s;L)¯ π (ˆ s;R) − π(ˆ s;R)¯ π(ˆ s;L)
The result then follows from (1) above.
A.2 More general signal space
The model presented in the body of the paper assumes that ﬁrms receive a binary signal of the
state of the world and then make a binary report to consumers. Bias arose in this context as pure
distortion–ﬁrms sometimes reporting ˆ r when their signal was l. In this section, we extend the
model to the case where ﬁrms’ underlying information is a continuous rather than binary signal.
We continue to assume that they make a binary report and consider the case of a monopoly ﬁrm
with homogeneous consumer beliefs. Assuming a continuous signal captures the idea that media
ﬁrms’ must take a large amount of underlying information and summarize or ﬁlter it into a much
simpler report for consumers. Note in particular that it can be seen as an approximation to the
case where ﬁrms receive a large number of underlying binary signals that are either r or l and must
choose one of these signals to report to consumers.
With a more general signal space, ﬁrms seeking to emulate the behavior of the high type will
still have a temptation to lean towards the prior beliefs of their customers. As before, the presence
of ex-post feedback will tend to discipline this incentive and therefore to reduce the amount of
equilibrium bias.
Suppose a normal ﬁrm receives a signal s ∈ (−b,b) with b ∈ (0,∞] whose distribution function
G(·) depends on the state of the world. (Here we use b = ∞ to denote the case in which (−b,b)=R.)
After observing this signal, the ﬁrm has the option of reporting either ˆ r or ˆ l. (We continue to assume
that the high type always reports the true state.) We assume that G(·) has full support on (−b,b),
and that higher values of s indicate a greater likelihood that the true state is R.M o r ep r e c i s e l y ,
we assume that
g (s | R)
g (s | L)
(R1)
is strictly increasing in s,w h e r eg(·) is the (continuous and diﬀerentiable) probability density
function associated with G(·). We will consider the case where where the ﬁrm’s prior θF is equal
to 1
2.











g (0 | R)=g (0 | L) (R4)
1 − G(0|R)=G(0|L) >θ (R5)
Restrictions (R2) and (R3) imply that as the value of s approaches the boundaries, it is strong
enough to overwhelm any non-doctrinaire prior. Restriction (R4) normalizes the signal space so
that a signal of 0 provides no information about the true state. The ﬁr s tp a r to f( R 5 )i sas y m m e t r y
condition that requires that the probability of a positive signal if the true state is R is equal to the
2probability of a negative signal if the true state is L. The second part of (R5) puts a lower bound
on the informativeness of the ﬁrm’s signal by guaranteeing that consumers in either group would
rather take action R when s>0 and L when s<0 than the action that is optimal given their
priors. (This is analogous to our assumption that π>θin the two-signal model.)
Given these conditions, we have the following characterization of equilibrium behavior, where
we assume for simplicity that the ﬁrm reports ˆ r when it is indiﬀerent:
Appendix Proposition 2 There exists a cutoﬀ k∗ ∈ (−b,0] such that in any equilibrium the ﬁrm
reports ˆ r if and only if s ≥ k∗.T h ec u t o ﬀ k∗ is weakly increasing in μ and weakly decreasing in θ,
strictly whenever k∗ < 0.
Proof. The ﬁrst step is to show that any equilibrium strategy must take the cutoﬀ form. Let
C ⊂ (−b,b) be the set of signals such that the ﬁrm reports ˆ r.I ti ss u ﬃcient to show that if s0 ∈ C,
the ﬁrm will strictly prefer to report ˆ r after seeing any s00 >s 0. Note that conditional on consumers
receiving exogenous feedback, increasing the signal s increases the ﬁrm’s posterior on the true state
θF (s) and so strictly increases the expected gain to reporting ˆ r rather than ˆ l. Conditional on no
feedback, increasing s does not change the expected gain to reporting ˆ r.T h u s ,aﬁrm that weakly
preferred reporting ˆ r after s0 must strictly prefer reporting ˆ r after s00.
We now show that the cutoﬀ k∗ exists and is unique. Suppose consumers expect the ﬁrm to
play a strategy with cutoﬀ k0. Write the ﬁrm’s expected gain to reporting ˆ r rather than ˆ l given a









The argument in the previous paragraph shows that ∆() is strictly increasing in s for a given
k0. Therefore a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a cutoﬀ k∗ to be an equilibrium is that
∆(k∗,k∗)=0 . ∆() is also strictly increasing in k0 for a given s, since increasing the cutoﬀ makes
normal ﬁrms more likely to report ˆ l and less likely to report ˆ r (thus decreasing the posteriors on
quality after the former report and increasing them after the latter). The facts that ∆() is strictly







mean that such a k∗ exists and is unique.
To see that k∗ ≤ 0, suppose ﬁrst that consumers expect a cutoﬀ k0 =0and that the ﬁrm sees
as i g n a ls =0 . Then (R4) implies that consumers’ posteriors on quality will be the same as in
the binary model with π = G(0|L). The fact that θF (0) = 1
2 then implies that the ﬁrm will be
indiﬀerent about its report conditional on feedback. The gain to reporting ˆ r conditional on no
feedback, ∆nf (0),w i l lb ez e r oi fθ = 1
2 and strictly positive if θ>1
2.T h e r e f o r e∆(0,0) ≥ 0,w h i c h
implies that k∗ ≤ 0,w i t hk∗ < 0 whenever θ>1
2.
T os e et h ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i co nθ, recall that the only terms in the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀst h a t
change with θ are consumers’ posteriors on quality conditional on no feedback. Lemma 1 implies
that increasing θ increases the posterior after ˆ r and decreases the posterior after ˆ l,s t r i c t l yi fk∗ < 0.
∆(s,k0) is therefore increasing in θ for any s and k0, which means the equilibrium k∗ is decreasing
in θ (strictly if k∗ < 0).
T os e et h ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c so nμ,n o t et h a ta tθ = 1
2, ∆nf (0) = ∆f (0,0) = 0.T h u s t h e
equilibrium at this point is independent of μ. For the case where k∗ < 0, it is possible to show that
3(R1) and (R5) imply ∆nf (k∗) > 0 and ∆f (k∗,k∗) < 0.S i n c e∆(k∗,k∗)=0 ,i n c r e a s i n gμ makes
∆() strictly negative and so k∗ must increase to restore equilibrium.
A.3 Allowing for a dishonest high type
In the model presented in the body of the paper, we assume that a high-type ﬁrm both knows
the true state of the world and always reports its signal honestly in the reporting stage. In this
subsection, we relax the latter assumption and permit the high type to choose its reporting-stage
action so as to maximize future proﬁts, which we now assume are given by the same continuation
payoﬀ function f() that determines the payoﬀ of normal ﬁrms. While there are multiple equilibria
in this case, we show that the strategy proﬁle studied in the body of the paper is unique with
respect to an intuitive stability criterion.
It is easy to verify that there exists an equilibrium in which high-type ﬁrms report honestly and
normal-type ﬁrms play the strategy deﬁned in proposition 1. That is, the equilibrium studied in the
body of the paper survives when we permit high-type ﬁrms to choose their actions optimally. To see
why, note that by deﬁnition normal types will be willing to play the strategy deﬁn e di np r o p o s i t i o n
1 given that high types are reporting honestly, since that is the assumption that is maintained
throughout proposition 1. To see that in this case the high type will be willing to report honestly,
observe that the only diﬀerence in the reporting incentives of the high and normal types come
through the ﬁrm’s posterior on the true state. The presence of feedback therefore guarantees that
the high type always has strictly more incentive than the normal type to report honestly. Since
normal ﬁr m sa l w a y sw e a k l yp r e f e rt or e p o r tˆ r given a signal of r, high types must strictly prefer to
report ˆ r in this case since then they are assured of matching the feedback. Additionally, since the
normal ﬁrm either strictly prefers to report ˆ l given a signal of l or is indiﬀerent to its report in that
case, the high type will strictly prefer to report ˆ l. Therefore it is an equilibrium for the high type
to report honestly and for the normal type to play the strategy characterized in proposition 1.
Other equilibria are also possible, however. Given the continuation payoﬀsw ea s s u m e ,t h e
normal type always wishes to emulate the high type’s reporting strategy. If the high type is not
being perfectly honest, in general the strategy deﬁned in proposition 1 will not be an equilibrium,
because the normal type’s equilibrium play will involve additional bias in the direction of matching
the high type’s behavior.
Such equilibria are unstable in an intuitive sense, however. In any equilibrium in which the high
type’s strategy involves randomization given some signal, a small perturbation to the high type’s
behavior would lead the proposed equilibrium to “unravel.” To see why, consider that if the high
type sometimes reports ˆ r when its signal is l, then high-type ﬁrms must be indiﬀerent between
reporting ˆ r and reporting ˆ l given consumers’ beliefs about the strategies of the two types. But
then a small increase in the probability of the high type reporting ˆ r will increase the incentives for
the high type to do so. This in turn will lead high-type ﬁrms to move towards reporting ˆ r more
frequently, and so on until the process reaches a boundary.
By contrast, the equilibrium characterized by proposition 1 is stable in the sense that high-type
ﬁrms strictly prefer to play their equilibrium strategies, and when normal ﬁrms become more likely
to report ˆ r, this reduces the incentive for them to say ˆ r, so that behavior has a tendency to return
to the equilibrium point.
To deﬁne stability formally, let q ∈ {0,1} index whether a ﬁrm is high-type (with q =1
denoting a high-type ﬁrm), and let σs (ˆ s;q) ∈ [0,1] be the probability that type q reports ˆ s given
as i g n a lo fs. Analogously, let ∆(s;q) be type q’s net return to reporting ˆ r given a signal of s.
We will say that an equilibrium is stable if for all q and s,e i t h e r|∆(s;q)| > 0 or ∆(s;q)=0and
∂∆(s;q)/∂σs (ˆ r;q) < 0. That is, an equilibrium is stable if for each signal s and type q, either the
4type strictly prefers its equilibrium report, or it is indiﬀerent between reports and an increase in
its probability of its reporting ˆ r strictly decreases its return to doing so. This deﬁnition captures
the idea that when a type’s behavior is perturbed, it ought to have an incentive to move back to
the equilibrium point.
Finally, the model also permits equilibria in which both normal and high quality ﬁrms always
make the same report regardless of their signal. For example, if consumers expect both normal
a n dh i g ht y p e st oa l w a y sr e p o r tˆ r, their beliefs about quality will be unchanged when they see
ˆ r regardless of the exogenous feedback. Seeing ˆ l, on the other hand, is a zero probability event
so we could assign consumers the belief that if this node is reached the ﬁrm is normal for sure.
This means all types would strictly prefer to report ˆ r so this would be a stable equilibrium. This
is not a particularly interesting equilibrium, however, because the ﬁrm’s report would have no
value to consumers. We will refer to equilibria in which both types of ﬁr m sa l w a y sm a k et h es a m e
report as degenerate and focus on the set of non-degenerate equilibria. We also implicitly ignore
the equilibrium in which the high type plays a pure “lying” strategy–i.e. always reports ˆ l when
the state is R and vice-versa–since this is equivalent to the equilibrium in proposition 1 up to a
relabeling of the reports.
We now have the following result:
Appendix Proposition 3 There exists a unique non-degenerate stable equilibrium in which the
high type reports honestly, and the normal type plays the equilibrium strategy deﬁned in proposition
1.
Proof. We have already shown that these strategies constitute an equilibrium. To see that
it is stable observe that all types except possibly the normal type who has seen a signal l strictly
prefer to make the report called for in the equilibrium. We showed in proposition 1 that in this
equilibrium ∂∆(l;0)/∂σl (ˆ r;0)< 0 whenever σl (ˆ r;0)> 0, so that the equilibrium is stable.
Proposition 1 established that this equilibrium is unique in the class of equilibria in which the
high type reports honestly. Therefore to complete the proof we need only show that there exists
no stable equilibrium in which the high type misreports with positive probability. If the high type
never randomizes, it must be the case that either: (i) the high type misreports in both states with
probability one, which is equivalent to a relabeling of the equilibrium in proposition 1; or (ii) the
high type misreports one state with probability one and reports the other state honestly, which
would be a degenerate equilibrium. Suppose, then, that for some signal s0 the high type randomizes.
Then we must have ∆(s0;1)=0. But an increase in the probability of high-type ﬁrms reporting ˆ r
will lead to an increase in the incentive to report ˆ r,i . e .t h a t∂∆(s;1)/∂σs (ˆ r;1)> 0,s oa n ys u c h
equilibrium fails to meet the deﬁnition of stability.
B Evidence from the Gallup Poll of the Islamic World
In this appendix, we study the relationship between prior opinions and assessments of news me-
dia quality using survey evidence from the Muslim world on consumer evaluations of the satellite
news network CNN International. This exercise has two limitations relative to the experimental
approaches discussed in section 2. First, we cannot control exactly what information survey respon-
dents receive. If two individuals give diﬀerent evaluations of the quality of CNN, this could occur
because the individuals reacted diﬀerently to the same content, or because they saw slightly diﬀer-
ent content (say, two diﬀerent CNN news programs). Second, because the data are cross-sectional,
we do not have a direct measure of the opinions respondents possessed before exposure to CNN.
5We will therefore need to seek proxies for pre-existing attitudes and ask whether these proxies are
correlated with perceptions of CNN’s quality.
The data come from the 2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic World (The Gallup Organization,
2002). The sample consists of 10,004 respondents from nine predominantly Muslim countries.1
Respondents in all countries (except Iran) were asked to report whether each of the following ﬁve
descriptions applies to CNN: has comprehensive news coverage; has good analyses; is always on the
site of events; has daring, unedited news; has unique access to information. We have constructed
an overall measure of perceived quality equal to the share of these characteristics the respondent
feels CNN possesses. This measure has a correlation of over .7 with each individual component,
and therefore seems like a good proxy for the respondent’s overall attitude toward the quality of
CNN’s news coverage.
As we discuss in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004), relative to the media environment in the sample
countries, CNN is quite pro-United States in its coverage. In the context of the above model, then,
we would expect respondents whose prior opinions are less pro-United States to rate CNN as being
of lower quality. To execute this test, we will ﬁr s tn e e dam e a s u r eo fprior opinions—opinions formed
before exposure to CNN content. We will use the respondent’s ranking of the importance of religion
in her life relative to four other concepts (own family/parents, extended family/local community,
country, and own self). The rank varies from one to ﬁve, and we have re-scaled (by subtracting one
and dividing by four) so that the measure varies from zero to one, with one implying that religion
is the most important among the list of ﬁve. It seems likely that the importance of religion in the
respondent’s life is predetermined with respect to television news viewership.
We predict that respondents who rank religion as being of greater importance are likely to have
more negative prior attitudes toward the United States. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 check this
prediction by regressing a measure of the respondent’s general attitude toward the United States
on the importance of religion variable. The measure of the respondent’s general attitude comes
from a question of the form “In general, what opinion do you have of the following nations?...The
United States.” Responses range from one (“very unfavorable”) to ﬁve (“very favorable”). We have
re-scaled this measure to vary from zero to one, with one being the most favorable toward the
United States.
As column (1) shows, respondents who indicate that religion plays an important role in their
lives tend to report less favorable attitudes toward the United States. Column (2) shows that
this relationship is robust to the inclusion of a wide set of demographic controls, indicating that
it is not likely to be driven by demographic variation in the population. Similar results can be
obtained using alternative measures of attitudes toward the United States, such as beliefs about
the justiﬁability of the September 11 attacks (results not shown).
Now that we have established the relationship between the importance of religion and attitudes
toward the United States, we can ask whether respondents who are likely to have a negative prior
opinion toward the United States—that is, respondents for whom religion is more important—rate
CNN as being of lower quality. Column (3) shows that this prediction of the above model is indeed
correct. An increase in the importance of religion of one standard deviation is associated with a
decrease in the perceived overall quality of CNN of about ﬁve percent of a standard deviation. As
column (4) shows, this ﬁnding is robust to the inclusion of a large set of demographic controls.
1Sample sizes by country are as follows: Pakistan (2,043), Iran (1,501), Indonesia (1,050), Turkey (1,019),
Lebanon (1,050), Morocco (1,000), Kuwait (790), Jordan (797), and Saudi Arabia (754). Other than a slight
oversampling of urban households, the samples are designed to be representative of the adult (18 and over)
population in each country. Further details on sample selection and survey methodology are available at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/summits/islam.asp.
6Appendix Table: Prior opinions and assessments of media quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
General attitude toward US Overall CNN quality rating
(Mean = .33, SD = .33) (Mean = .10, SD = .24)
Importance of religion -0.1711 -0.1520 -0.0418 -0.0291
(Mean = .76, SD = .30) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0101) (0.0100)
Country ﬁxed eﬀects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls? No Yes No Yes
N 8566 8566 7451 7451
R2 0.1432 0.1597 0.1575 0.1745
Notes: Respondents with missing data on dependent variable or importance of religion have been omitted
from the regressions reported. Results are weighted as recommended by the data providers. Demographic
controls include dummies for education, gender, age, urban/rural status, marital status. Missing data
dummies are included for all demographic controls.































































































































































































Notes: Data from Avery and Chevalier (1999). Dataset contains information on the picks of Boston Globe
sports columnists for NFL games in the 1984-1994 seasons, as well as the outcome of the game and the
opening betting line. The bar for team i represents the estimated coeﬃcient ˆ δi in a regression of the form
winj = α + δi [(homej = i) − (awayj = i)] + γ (linej)+εj
where winj denotes the share of local columnists picking the home team to win game j, homej indexes the
home team in game j, awayj indexes the visiting team in game j,a n dlinej is a vector of dummy variables
representing deciles of the opening betting line.
8